War is an awful business. Once started, all sorts of things can go wrong. That’s why no one should ever go into it lightly. Yet, there are circumstances where you come to the conclusion you have no real choice but to attack.

Before you move, those who studied war, from Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, to B.H. Liddell Hart cautioned that you need a clear objective—one that eliminates the problem or problems causing your decision to go to war. In the present case, the administration determined that as long as the mullahs ruled Iran, we faced intolerable threats, from nuclear war, attacks by Iran or its allies on others in the Mideast, or disruption of major trade routes.

The timing seems right. Thanks to mainly Israeli actions, we control the air over Iran. Sanctions and the Mullahs’ mismanagement have weakened the Iranian economy to a point where businesspeople have joined the young in longing for change.

Having determined that the mullahs in power pose an existential threat, anything short of regime change won’t solve the problems. The mullahs must go.

With the objective in place, what’s our strategy for success? We pay all those military people with all those medals and ribbons to show us the path to victory. Having studied the art of war all their lives, they should know what works and what to avoid.

I didn’t spend a lifetime in the military, but I did go to a military school, where our dedicated commandant taught the required military science courses. We studied what worked, or didn’t work, throughout the ages. Using your superior numbers or resources to overpower, frankly, is wasteful and may result in a “Pyrrhic victory,” named after the King who lost so much in winning that he couldn’t continue his war against the Romans.

Better to emulate Wee Willie Keeler, who succeeded in baseball by hitting the ball where the defenders “ain’t.” The Germans crushed France in WWII by attacking through the lightly defended Ardennes, which the French thought was impassable. Douglas MacArthur routed the North Koreans by landing his troops behind them at the impossible-to-land-at Inchon. Overcoming the terrain is often a solvable problem, leading to surprise and success. These are examples of an “indirect strategy.”

Putting your opponent on the “horns of the dilema” is something any military leader should strive for. It simply means presenting your opponent with two or more bad choices. Like one confronted with a charging bull, going right gets you gored by the bull’s left horn, but going left only gets you the right horn.

Eisenhower’s threat in WWII to invade either the Pas de Calais or Normandy is a classic example of being put on the “Horns of the Dilemma.”The Germans had to divide their forces. Hitler thought it would be Calais as the shortest distance, but some of his Generals picked Normandy. The dictator put more in Calais, and we, of course, landed in Normandy. The rest is history.

Japan established a chain of island bases across the Pacific to protect the home islands. Our navy chose to ignore these islands in favor of seizing less protected ones behind this line. This violated a supposed no-no: risking a cutoff by leaving enemy bases in their rear. We bet on our Seabees’ ability to build airbases, so the Japanese bases were the ones cut off.  

As we could pick between several islands, we had the Japanese on the “horns,” while we attacked where least expected, an indirect strategy. That’s the kind of strategic thinking we expect of our military.

When we started down the road of war with Iran, these principles underlay my assumption that our goal is Regime change. The question, then, is: how do we bring about the demise of the Mullahs and put the people in charge? My solution was partnering with the Kurds to free Kurdish areas in Iran, allowing us to arm, train, and organize the forces of freedom—a place for both locals and ex-pats to gather.

As a classic “horns of the dilemma” strategy, it leaves the basic forces of the present regime, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with a choice: concentrate its forces to retake the area or leave it alone to keep a hold on Tehran and other key areas. Attacking leaves them open to devastating airstrikes, while deploying troops and resources in this endeavor leaves them vulnerable elsewhere. If the deposed Shaw’s son is on Iranian soil with the rebel army, could the regime not attack?

However, if they adopt only a defensive posture, the ever-growing rebel forces are free to choose where and what to attack. leaving the regime still on “the horns of the dilema.”

A partnership with Kurds, one that worked well against ISIS, is my thought of how to achieve our goal in Iran. One I defended in my letter to The Wall Street Journal editors, when they came out against involving the Kurds; they were kind enough to print it. They visualize a Kurd-led army marching on Tehran, while I’m only proposing that the Kurds provide the revolution’s staging area for all Iranians.

My idea isn’t the only plan that might work, but it at least contains the ingredients for success, a goal, real regime change, and a strategy to achieve it. Compare this with the administration muddle. What is our goal? Is it regime change? Okay, how do we do it?

Do we leave the bad people in charge, on the promise that they’ll give us something, like Venezuela? What happens as soon as we turn our backs? Would this accomplish much of anything? Does this help or hurt the people?

Worse, we could declare victory while leaving the Mullahs still controlling the Straits of Hormuz. This huge American humiliation leaves our friends in the area at the Mullahs’ tender mercies.

Do we send in troops to seize some islands and coastline? How long will the public accept the casualties and cost?

There is even a question of whether the military is prepared for the war. Iran is a major Russian drone supplier for the Ukraine war, but even after four years of that war, we seem to lack anti-drone defense equal to what Ukraine has developed. That nation offered to help now, but this action seems very late in the game.

Add the lack of U.S. minesweepers to clear the Hormuz Strait, and you have to wonder what our war planning consisted of. The possibility of closing this vital route couldn’t come as a surprise.

That Donald Trump is all over the place on this war isn’t surprising, think of his tariffs. But his ever-changing stances are no excuse for our military leaders not to demand to know their goal and, when given, to provide a clear strategy and means to achieve it. That’s their job.

I castigated Biden’s top military advisers over the Afghan withdrawal. They offered no visible dissent at the time, only to later say, of course, they were against it. I can’t do less in the present circumstance. The time to speak up is before you act.

Even if their stance puts them at odds with the president, they need to tell him. If you think the president’s actions, or inaction, endanger our troops and nation, you know your craft and have to stand up and tell him in no uncertain terms. If he blows you off, resign and tell the nation why. The president’s personal feuds with Ukraine, NATO, or the Kurds shouldn’t color your recommendations.

As no one has resigned, one must conclude that what’s going on is part of the plan. Are these, then, professionals who never learned their craft?

My only hope is that all this has been the administration’s misdirection and that they had the goal and the plan all along. They followed Sun Tzu, “‘Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.” I’ll be the first to say wow if we wake up and find the Mullah regime is gone and Iran is no longer a world menace. Call me a “Cockeyed Optimist,” but the alternative is too horrible to contemplate.