It’s time to look back at ’23, which isn’t the best chore. My ideas were either ignored or only partially attempted. Russia’s Ukraine ’22 invasion not only fizzled but forced them to relinquish territory. Everyone was looking forward to the Ukrainian Summer Offensive to yield solid results, forcing the Russians to retreat. Meanwhile, pragmatists such as myself recommended right from the start training for and transferring aircraft to deny Russia any control of the air. Long-range weapons to strike bases and staging areas the Russians used to batter Ukrainian troops, civilians, and infrastructure are essential for success.

The summer offensive started without these necessities—no F16s or our old Warthogs, which might’ve given close air support. The Brits finally gave some long-range missiles, but only when the offense failed to make an early breakthrough. Imagine a U.S. attack on a well-dug-in enemy without air superiority and close support. In our Iraq wars, long-range missiles reached far beyond the battlefield to isolate. 

Yet, our military leaders expected breakthroughs and told everyone that the Ukrainians’ lack of significant success was a failure to follow their advice. Why would anyone follow Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and their minions? Their only military action of note is the disastrous Afgan withdrawal. Sacking the whole bunch in any other military is expected for less. Instead of making sure to the best of their ability, the brave Ukrainians had what they needed to succeed; they urged them forward when they had little chance of a breakthrough.